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The appropriateness of imposing criminal liability for negligent conduct has
been the subject of debate among criminal law scholars for many years. Ever
since H.L.A. Hart's defense of criminal negligence, the prevailing view has
favored its use. In this essay, I nevertheless argue against criminal negligence, on
the ground that criminal liability should only be imposed where the defendant was
aware he was engaging in the prohibited conduct, or where he was aware of
risking such conduct or result. My argument relies on the claim that criminal
liability should resemble judgments of responsibility in ordinary morality as
closely as possible. I argue that responsibility judgments in ordinary morality are
based on the agent's having acted intentionally, and that an agent does
intentionally what he chooses to do. Because agents choose to bring about those
effects of their actions they foresee as reasonably likely to follow from what they
do, they are responsible for such effects. They are not responsible for effects they
do not foresee, or for effects they deem highly unlikely, and they ought not to be
held criminally liable for them either.
I.
The purpose of this paper is to revisit an old question, namely whether there
should be crimes of negligence. The anti-negligence position was most famously
articulated by J.W.C. Turner in 1936, in an essay arguing that foresight of criminal
harm provides a necessary condition for criminal liability.' Turner's primary
argument for this claim was that a system of criminal liability that dispenses with
foresight of harm is tantamount to a system of strict liability. This position was
2
commonly accepted among criminal law theorists for many years.
Turner's position, however, was forcefully attacked by H.L.A. Hart, who
argued that the idea that negligence is a form of strict liability is based on "a
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mistaken conception both of the way in which mental or 'subjective' elements are
involved in human action, and of the reason why we attach the great importance
which we do to the principle that liability to criminal punishment should be
conditional on the presence of a mental element."3 Turner's mistake, Hart claimed,
was to see negligence as a state of mind. While he agreed that the mind of the man
who acts inadvertently is a blank with respect to something he did negligently,
Hart argued that we need not locate the notion of mens rea in a defendant's
subjective state of mind. Instead he writes, "we can perfectly well both deny that a
man may be criminally responsible for 'mere inadvertence' and also deny that he is
only responsible if 'he has an idea in his mind of harm to someone. ''4 Negligence
lies not in the state of a man's mind, but in his failure to live up to an objective
standard of conduct.
Imagine a workman mending a roof in a busy town, throwing bricks into the
street below him without looking to see if anyone is passing by. According to
Hart, Turner would require us to choose between two possibilities: Either the
workman has the conscious idea that he might harm someone, in which case he is
to blame for any injuries he causes, or he has no such idea, in which case any harm
he inflicts is inadvertent. But, argues Hart, the workman "failed to comply with a
standard of conduct with which any ordinary reasonable man could and would
have complied: a standard requiring him to take precautions against harm." 5 This
entitles us to hold him responsible, despite the fact that he lacked awareness of
what he was doing. Hart's central argument is thus that we can account for the
"subjective" element of fault in normative terms, by tying the standard of liability
to an individual's particular capacities. The workman acts negligently, not merely
inadvertently, because he has a duty to take care to avoid injury, and he has the
capacity to take such care. As long as the standards to which we hold one another
are adjusted to account for the capacities of the defendant, there is no reason to
think we have adopted an "objective," or strict standard of liability.
Criminal law theorists have largely sided with Hart's view of the matter, with
the result that Turner's position is no longer seriously defended. Most criminal
commentators now seem to accept liability for negligence in at least some form.6
In my view, however, Turner had the better position, even if he lacked compelling
arguments for it. There are two reasons for this. First, Hart incorrectly takes
Turner's argument to be a blanket attack on objective systems of liability. Hart
then counters what he takes to be Turner's point by turning to a standard that takes
into account the defendant's own capacities. And Hart is right that a negligence
standard tailored to the defendant's capacities would certainly be non-objective in
3 H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 139
(1968).
4 Id. at 147.
I ld. at 147-48.
6 See George Fletcher, The Theory of Criminal Negligence: A Comparative Analysis, 119 U.
PA. L. REv. 401,415 (1971).
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the sense of being individualized. But individualized is not the same as subjective.
And Turner's argument is not just an attack on objective approaches to liability. It
is rather an insistence that a person should not be held criminally liable in the
absence of some subjective awareness on his part of what he was doing, under its
prohibited description. To answer this challenge by saying that negligent liability
is individualized is non-responsive.
Second, and more importantly, Turner's claim that negligent liability is a form
of strict liability seems to me to be absolutely correct. It is, moreover, correct for
precisely the reason Turner gives, namely that liability in the absence of that
subjective element is objectionable because it is liability in the absence of ordinary
responsibility. Turner's problem was that he was unable to offer any account of
responsibility, and hence he lacked any way of accounting for the relevance of
subjectivity to that notion. It is the purpose of the present essay to remedy this
deficiency by providing such an account.
In what follows, I approach the question by placing negligent criminal
liability in the context of a more general theory of responsibility for action. That
is, I assume that the criminal law is simply another form of ordinary, non-criminal
responsibility. (I attempt some defense of this claim at the end of the essay, but for
the moment will simply assume it.) I then approach the question of negligent
responsibility in a roundabout way: I examine another type of responsibility for
"unintended" effects, namely cases in which an agent is aware of, but does not
intend, the violation of a prohibitory norm. Extrapolating from these cases, I argue
that our ordinary responsibility practices are predicated on the notion of choice.
As such, they extend only to things agents do with awareness of what they are
doing or risking. I conclude that negligence is incompatible with traditional
principles of criminal responsibility.
II.
Placing criminal liability in the context of judgments of responsibility in
ordinary morality does not make our task easier. For ordinary morality both seems
to encompass, and to reject, liability for negligent conduct. We sometimes find
ourselves irate with a person for forgetting something important, at the same time
that we accept "I simply forgot" as a plea in exoneration. While criminal law
theorists have sometimes thought ordinary morality firmly on the side of
responsibility for inadvertence, ordinary moral practice is not as clear a guide as
might be supposed. For this reason, I shall approach the problem of negligent
responsibility by the back door. Instead of considering ordinary moral practices
relating to forgetting, inadvertence,7 and failure to take precautions, I shall begin
by considering our moral practices relating to clear cases of responsibility. I shall
7 See id. at 415 ("In daily conduct, we confidently blame others who fail to advert to
significant risks.").
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then attempt to extrapolate a conception of responsibility from these more ordinary
cases, and see what it in turn implies for cases of negligence.
The dominant treatment of responsibility in the philosophical literature sees
that notion as a normative one-a judgment made of a human agent for something
he did, rendered on moral grounds. Moreover, normally the thing the agent did
was bad or reprehensible. Philosophers treat an agent as "morally responsible" for
what he is to blame for having done. They do not tend to speak of "responsibility"
for praiseworthy acts.
This way of proceeding may seem peculiar, but many authors on this subject
at least tacitly assume it, and some even defend it explicitly. R.J. Wallace, for
example, writes that
the question of what it is to be a morally responsible agent should be
given what I call a normative interpretation. If we wish to make sense of
the idea that there are facts about what it is to be a responsible agent, it is
best not to picture such facts as conceptually prior to and independent of
our practice of holding people responsible.8
Hart had previously defended this position as well. In The Ascription of
Responsibility and Rights, he wrote: "[S]entences of the form 'He did it' have been
traditionally regarded as primarily descriptive whereas their principal function is
what I venture to call ascriptive, being quite literally to ascribe responsibility for
actions." 9 Responsibility ascriptions are made, he claimed, in accordance with a
set of antecedent moral or legal norms. Hart's account in that paper is both
prescriptive and conventional: Responsibility is something that must be assigned,
the way people are assigned numbers waiting on line in a bakery, and the form in
which responsibility is assigned is a function of social purposes. As Hart wrote,
"assigning responsibility in the way we do assign it tends to check crime and
encourage virtue," and Hart thought this provides both the explanation and the
justification for our assigning responsibility where and how we do.i°
While Hart later distanced himself from his early work on responsibility," the
ascriptivism of his account remained in other guise, and with it, the problems with
that approach. The central problem is that the ascriptive approach leaves us
empty-handed when it comes to describing an agent's relation to ordinary, non-
morally charged actions. Smith's playing the piano, on this account, is not
something we can lay at Smith's door, assuming he did not play particularly well
or badly, since there would be no moral or conventional purpose to making such an
8 R.J. WALLACE, RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MORAL SENTIMENTS 1 (1994).
9 H.L.A. Hart, The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights, in LOGIC AND LANGUAGE 151
(Antony Flew ed., 1965).
10 Id. at 173. This aspect of Hart's view remained central to his writing in later years, and to
his famous claim that what he called the General Justifying Aim of Punishment is a utilitarian one.
1 See HART, supra note 3, at 145.
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assignment. But we would say that Smith is responsible for injuring the child, if
he hit him, or for breaking the window, if he threw a baseball through it, since
judging him thus fits with some normative purpose we have in mind. It is odd,
however, to think of playing the piano as fundamentally different from hitting the
child or breaking the window. We most naturally think of agents as equally
responsible in all three cases.
What we require from a notion of responsibility is a way of capturing an
agent's relation to ordinary things he does, without yet considering whether those
actions are morally significant. 12 Thus Smith is the agent of, or is responsible for,
playing the piano, tying his shoelaces, combing his hair, and sipping his coffee.
Moreover, he is responsible for these things in a way that he is not responsible for
tripping over the rug, spilling his coffee, and kicking his leg when the doctor tests
his reflexes. What we want, in other words, is a way of capturing an agent's
relation to things he does qua rational agent, since these are things for which it
makes sense to raise questions of praise or blame. We require, in short, a
descriptive conception of responsibility.
In criminal law theory, the persistent application of a normative conception of
responsibility has had certain infelicitous results. First, the normative approach
makes it difficult to make sense of certain justifications and excuses. What should
we say, for example, about the person who robs the bank under duress, if we think
the pressure he was under provides him with a good excuse? Most naturally, we
would say he is responsible for robbing the bank, since he did so intentionally, but
that we do not blame him for it because he did it for a good reason. That is, we
distinguish his prima facie responsibility for robbing the bank from his ultimate
blameworthiness for it, and find a basis for withholding criminal punishment based
on the latter. On a normative conception of responsibility, however, we must say
he is not responsible for robbing the bank. Not surprisingly, this is precisely how
Hart treats such cases: He says that the fact that someone did something
"accidentally," "inadvertently," "by mistake," or "while insane" has the same
effect as his acting in self-defense or under duress, in that both sorts of defense
defeat prima facie responsibility.
The question regarding negligence arises at the level of the prima facie case:
Is a person who brings about harm inadvertently responsible for it, in the
descriptive sense? Hart says that a person can be responsible for things he does
negligently because we can blame him for failing to live up to a normative
standard of which he was capable. But this approach confuses responsibility with
blameworthiness. We cannot ask about a person's normative failings until we
examine whether he is responsible in a descriptive sense. Our question is thus
whether people are responsible for what they do inadvertently, such that they
might sometimes be blamed for failing to live up to a certain normative standard.
12 1 mean here to be focusing on responsibility for "things done," as opposed to what we
might call "capacity responsibility," namely the set of capacities that characterize normal adults.
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This will require us to investigate more thoroughly the nature of the descriptive
notion of responsibility for which I have been arguing. We turn to this below.
A second drawback of the normative approach to responsibility is that it will
require divergent accounts of responsibility for moral and legal judgments. Since
moral and legal criteria for normative judgments diverge, the relevant accounts of
agency will also diverge if that notion is already infused with judgments of
blameworthiness. But it seems reasonable to suppose that the conditions of
responsibility themselves should be invariant as between moral and legal
responsibility, and that what differs between the two is just the particular
normative system one brings to bear on the responsible agent's conduct. Moral
and legal responsibility should have a common denominator, and it is this that the
normative approach to responsibility cannot capture. The task of the next section
will be to articulate an account of a descriptive notion of responsibility that might
serve as this common denominator.
III.
What is the feature that best characterizes things human agents do in their
capacity as rational animals? The usual philosophical answer is that human beings
act as rational animals insofar as they act according to an end. Human reason is
thus fundamentally teleological, and human behavior is characteristically rational
insofar as it is motivated in this way. The notion of responsibility we have been
discussing is both characteristically human and intrinsically related to the idea of
action. A natural thought to have about the notion of responsibility we have
identified, then, is that it can be accounted for in teleological terms.
We may find confirmation for this approach in the traditional philosophical
analysis of the notion of "intentional action." According to the Standard Account,
a person acts intentionally just in case he acts for a reason, where acting for a
reason implies that he acts for the sake of something he wants or is trying to get.
The Standard Account can be summarized with the following two theses:
Thesis (1): Someone does something intentionally if (and only if) he
does it for a reason.
Thesis (2): Someone does something for a reason if (and only if) he does
it for the sake of something he wanted or was trying to get.
We might then attempt to combine the Standard Account with a thesis about
responsibility:
Thesis (3): Someone is responsible for something he did if (and only if)
he did it intentionally.
13
'3 J.L. Mackie calls a closely related principle the "straight rule" of responsibility. J.L.
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In combination with the Standard Account of intentional action, Thesis (3)
would define the ambit of responsibility as those things an agent does for the sake
of something he wants.
If all three of the above theses were correct, we would have to conclude that
agents are not responsible for things they do unintentionally. But it will be
immediately apparent that we cannot reason in this way, since there are at least
some cases of things agents do unintentionally for which we cannot deny
responsibility. Considering such cases will make clear that at least one of Theses
(1) through (3) must be false.
Consider this case. A seller of goods is about to ship some heavily insured
cargo aboard a passenger plane, when the buyer cancels his order for the goods.
Faced with the prospect of imminent financial ruin, the seller formulates a plan to
destroy the plane: plant a bomb to explode mid-flight and collect the insurance on
the goods. He regrets that the passengers will almost certainly die in the process,
but he is not dissuaded. He executes his plan, and as expected the cargo is
destroyed, and no one survives. Call this case "Insurance Bomber."
Unlike where examples of negligence are concerned, we cannot simply
abandon the claim that the insurance bomber is responsible for the deaths for the
passengers, given that he is fully aware his actions will result in their deaths.
Indeed, Insurance Bomber is a paradigmatic case of responsibility for evil, since
truly reprehensible conduct often stems more from indifference and selfishness
than from directed malevolence. But it should be clear that we cannot say the
insurance bomber is responsible for the deaths of the passengers at the same time
that we maintain Theses (1) through (3). For Thesis (3) implies that if the bomber
is responsible for killing the passengers, he must have killed them intentionally.
But according to the Standard Account (Theses (1) and (2) together), he did not
kill them intentionally because he did not kill them for a reason. We must
therefore choose between rejecting the Standard Account and rejecting the thesis
that connects responsibility with what an agent does intentionally (Thesis 3).
The obvious solution might seem to be to reject Thesis (3). And the instances
in ordinary morality in which we do appear to blame agents for causing harm
unintentionally weigh on the side of this solution. Cases like Insurance Bomber,
we might be tempted to argue, show conclusively that we do hold agents
responsible for things they do unintentionally. And while this does not mean that
we hold them responsible for all unintentional harm they cause, there is no reason
in principle to reject responsibility for unintentional harm in cases in which
ordinary morality seems to support such ascriptions of responsibility. There is thus
no reason in principle to reject the blameworthiness of negligent conduct in
MACKIE, ETHICS: INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG 208 (1977). Mackie identifies the straight rule as
the rule that "an agent is responsible for all and only his intentional actions." Thesis (3) talks about
something someone did, rather than about actions, in order to include intentional omissions within its
scope.
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ordinary morality, and so no reason to reject the use of negligent liability in the
criminal law.
Proponents of the Standard Account might argue in this way. Indeed, Jennifer
Hornsby has argued vigorously that one should not expect the theory of action to
"deliver the goods" for the criminal lawyer. On the one hand, the notion of
intentional action is entirely a psychological one. She writes: "whether someone
did something intentionally is, in a certain sense, a question about
her .... [I]t is to her states of mind that we need to advert in order to settle the
question."' 14 But the question of responsibility is a normative one. There is thus no
reason to suppose that the former concept would provide a basis for making
ascriptions of the latter sort. Thesis (3) is confused, she would say, in seeking to
connect the concept of intentional action with judgments of responsibility.
Intentional action, like intention, tracks reasons for acting. But ascriptions of
responsibility are entirely a matter of the norms to which we subscribe. Hornsby's
view of intentional action would fit well with Hart's ascriptive account of
responsibility.
I nevertheless believe this quick and straightforward solution to our problem
mistaken, for at least two reasons. First is a point in ordinary language concerning
the adverb "intentionally." It seems perfectly appropriate to say that the person
who knocks over the vase through inadvertence does not knock it over
intentionally. This is even so when the consequences are grave, such as the tragic
case of the person who runs his own child over when backing down a driveway. If
the agent was not aware of any risk that his child was behind him, then even if he
should have been aware of a risk, we do not say he ran over his child
"intentionally." But it would be exceedingly odd to say that the bomber did not
kill the passengers intentionally. It is much less odd to say that he did not intend to
kill them. And this indicates a curious feature about the family of concepts
surrounding intention and intentional action: What a person does, intending to do
it, may identify a narrower class than what a person does intentionally. The
bomber, for example, did not intend to kill the passengers. But it seems quite
natural to say he killed them intentionally.
Now the fact that more things are done intentionally (under a given
description) than are done with an intention is not, by itself, an argument for
retaining Thesis (3). But it does make it possible to retain Thesis (3), even if the
reach of responsibility is broader than the class of things people do with an
intention. And if the observation from ordinary language we made is correct, then
there is reason to draw out the concept of what is done intentionally in precisely
the way that is required: We can make the concept of intentional action as broad as
the concept of responsibility. If we have a way of making this broader notion of
intentional action philosophically respectable, we would have found a way of
making Thesis (3) philosophically respectable as well.
14 Jennifer Hornsby, On What's Intentionally Done, in ACTION AND VALUE IN CRIMINAL LAW
55, 66 (Stephen Shute et al. eds., 1993).
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The second problem with the above argument for the elimination of Thesis (3)
is that there is some independent reason to think Thesis (3) correct. In particular,
cases like Insurance Bomber support the idea of a linkage between intentional
action and responsibility. There is a felt connection between responsibility and
what is done intentionally that is lacking in the relation between responsibility and
what is done with an intention. Imagine how outrageous it would be for the
bomber to say, "Yes, I admit I killed the passengers intentionally, since I knew that
they would die. But I am not responsible for killing them, since I didn't intend to
do so." Rather, the fact that he killed them intentionally seems to carry with it the
idea that he is responsible for killing them. And conversely, it would be only a
little less odd for someone to deny that he did something intentionally, but not
regard that as mitigating his responsibility. The person who says, "I didn't do it
intentionally" seems to be making a plea for exoneration. He seems to be offering
his hearers a reason why they should not blame him for something he did.
To some, the idea of a connection between judgments of intentional agency
and judgments of responsibility seems quite obvious. Indeed, some philosophers
have claimed that the concepts bear an analytic relationship to one another. R. A.
Duff, for example, writes that "[a]scriptions of intentional agency are, as a matter
of meaning, ascriptions of responsibility."' 5 If this intuitive connection between
responsibility and intentional action is correct, we have particular incentive to try
to cash out the latter notion in a way that will provide an appropriate foundation
for judgments of responsibility. As we shall see, this would supply quite a
different solution to our problem than rejecting Thesis (3), which seemed at first
most appealing. Instead of rejecting Thesis (3), we would be required to reject
either Thesis (1) or Thesis (2). Let us consider these possibilities in turn.
The solution that rejects Thesis (1) would preserve the view that acting for a
reason is acting for the sake of an end. It would also retain the connection between
responsibility and what an agent does intentionally. But it would reject the
connection between what an agent does intentionally and what he does for a
reason, and along with it, the standard association between what an agent does
intentionally and what he intended to do. Acting with an intention, on this view, is
associated with acting for a reason, while what an agent does intentionally would
be linked to the broader category of responsible agency. Reason thus sides with
the narrower concept of intention, rather than the broader concept of responsibility.
According to this solution, then, the insurance bomber killed the passengers
intentionally, and he is responsible for having done so, but he did not intend to kill
them, since he did not kill them for a reason.
Michael Bratman favors this solution. He rejects what he calls the "Simple
View," according to which it follows from the fact that someone did something
intentionally that he intended to do it. Thus consider the person who knowingly
scratches a car next to him when pulling into a tight parking space. The Simple
View would say that if he intentionally scratched the car, he must have intended to
15 R.A. DUFF. INTENTION. AGENCY & CRIMINAL LIABILITY 77 (1990).
2005]
OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LA W
scratch it. But since the driver did not intend to scratch the car, given that he did
not try to scratch it, we cannot say he scratched it intentionally.' 6 But Bratman
thinks it is possible to do something intentionally without having intended to do it.
The driver intentionally scratched the car, despite the fact that he never intended to
scratch it. Bratman does not claim that all foreseen side effects of one's
intentional actions are intentional. Only those effects that lie within the
,'motivational potential" of one's action should be thought of as done
intentionally, 17 meaning that a person must have consciously adverted to and
actually deliberated on an effect for it to count as something done intentionally.
There is no reason to think that I intentionally wear down the soles of my shoes
when I run a marathon in the normal course of events, even if I am aware of
wearing them down. But if there is some reason why I particularly attend to that
effect of my action, such as that my shoes are a family heirloom, then it makes
sense to say I wear them down intentionally, despite the fact that I do not intend to
wear them down. Such cases falsify the Simple View.
Someone who rejects the Simple View must reject the Standard Account as
well: Theses (1) and (2) in combination commit one to the position that doing
something intentionally entails that one intended to do it, assuming we treat acting
with an intention as a species of acting for the sake of an end. So Bratman must
reject either Thesis (1) or Thesis (2). Which of the two theses does he in fact
reject? Bratman accepts the standard, instrumental approach to practical reason,
according to which an agent acts rationally insofar as he acts in pursuit of
something he wants. His argument for rejecting the Simple View is limited to the
notion of intentional action, and he otherwise aligns acting with an intention with
what an agent does for a reason. His central claim is that the usual account of
practical reason fails to accord sufficient weight to planning activity. Plans give us
reasons to do things, in a way that allows rational agents to avoid having to go
back each time to their background reasons in order to decide what to do. But
plans, like intentions, are teleological: an agent who acts on a plan acts for the sake
of an end. As Bratman explains, plans are "intentions writ large."' 18 By expanding
rational agency to include planning, Bratman is not fundamentally challenging the
teleological structure of instrumental rationality. His rejection of the Simple View
is thus an implicit rejection of Thesis (1).
For the driver pulling into the tight parking spot, Bratman says, scratching the
adjacent car is part of his overall plan for parking his car.' 9 Its being part of his
plan makes it intentional, but it does not make it something done for a reason,
since scratching the car is not a means to parking the car. On both the standard
conception and the planning conception of agency, the driver has no independent
16 MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, INTENTIONS, PLANS AND PRACTICAL REASONS, ch. 8 (1987).
17 Id. at 124-26. For a variation on this theme, see DUFF, supra note 15, ch. 4.
18 BRATMAN, supra note 16, at 29.
"9 Id. at 29.
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reason to scratch the car-independent of his plan for parking his car. And if he
has no independent reason for scratching the car, he has no reason for scratching it,
Bratman says.
But someone might argue for a different understanding of such cases. Why
does the fact that the driver has no independent reason to scratch the adjacent car
mean he has no reason? Why doesn't the fact that he has a reason for adopting the
plan of which scratching the car is a part give him a reason to scratch it? True, if
he pulled into the space without scratching it, he would not have a reason to back
up and try again, this time cutting it closer so as to ensure a scratch. But it is not
clear why independence is a necessary condition for something to count as a
reason. Another feature of reasons is that they provide explanations for people's
actions. Here, the fact that the driver wanted to pull into the parking spot does
explain why he scratched the car. I shall explore this thought in greater detail in
the next Part. I mention it now only to suggest that if plausible, it would provide
us with a way of making sense of Bratman's claim that the driver scratches the car
intentionally-namely that he does so for a reason.
The problem with accounts that reject Thesis (1) is that it is not of any
obvious benefit to be able to say that an agent did something intentionally if that
notion is not one we can relate to the rational-explanatory principle on which he
acts. The intuition that agents are responsible for what they do intentionally
presumably stems from an intuitive link between an agent's doing something
intentionally and his reasons for acting. Judgments of responsibility bear a special
relation to rational agency to the extent they bear on an agent's reasons for acting.
To misappropriate a thought from Elizabeth Anscombe, the realm of responsibility
is the realm of things to which a certain sense of the Why? question has
application, where that question calls for the agent's reason for doing what he
did.20 But if we reject the connection between intentional action and reasons for
acting, we cannot say that a person who acts intentionally must be able to explain
what he did in terms of his reasons for acting.
Let us call an account of responsibility that connects what an agent is
responsible for with what he does for a reason an "intemalist" account. And let us
call any account that denies this connection "extemalist." The view that consists
in rejecting Thesis (1) and retaining Theses (2) and (3) is externalist, since the
category of what an agent does intentionally is broader than the category of what is
done for a reason. What I have in effect suggested is that we may have grounds
for preferring an internalist to an externalist account, insofar as judgments of
responsibility are most intelligible to us if they connect with reasons for acting.
Let us consider what an internalist account, namely an account that rejects Thesis
(2) and retains Theses (1) and (3), might look like.
20 ELIZABETH ANSCOMBE, INTENTION § 5 (1957).
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V.
Insurance Bomber demonstrated a tension between our intuitions about
responsibility and our intuitions about intentional action. We have considered two
possible solutions thus far. The first is the Standard Account of intentional action,
according to which the notion of responsibility should have nothing to do with our
underlying account of intentional action. The second solution would distinguish
what a person does with an intention from what he does intentionally, as a way of
allowing judgments of responsibility to connect with the latter notion. But it
would restrict the category of things people do for reasons to that which they
intended to do, and would articulate the category of intentional action in a way that
is distinct from reasons for acting.
We will now consider a third solution. This solution preserves the
connections between what an agent does intentionally and responsibility, as well as
between what an agent does intentionally and what he does for a reason. Its
account of responsibility is "internalist," insofar as it ties judgments of
responsibility to reasons for acting. But it abandons the claim that acting for a
reason is limited to acting for the sake of an end. Like the second solution we
considered, this solution uncouples doing something intentionally from doing
something with an intention: What is done with an intention is still understood in
terms of the "for the sake of' relation, while what is done intentionally is
accounted for in terms of some broader view of acting for a reason.
The difficulty for this account lies in offering an acceptable alternative to the
"for the sake of' requirement Thesis (2) imposes. Reasons for acting have long
been thought of in teleological terms-the reason for which something is done is
the reason for the sake of which it is done. If we wish to say the insurance bomber
kills the passengers for a reason, we will have to offer an account of what it is to
do something for a reason which does not require reason for the sake of which,
since the insurance bomber does not kill the passengers for the sake of anything.
The insurance bomber's reason for blowing up the plane is to get the
insurance money on the cargo. If asked why he blew up the plane, his answer, if
truthful, would mention this reason. The claim of those who adhere to the
Standard Account is that unlike blowing up the plane, the insurance bomber has no
reason for killing the passengers. As Anscombe suggests, the Why? question in
this case is "refused application.",21 But as we already briefly saw in discussing
Michael Bratman's view, perhaps this is incorrect. Suppose we were to ask the
insurance bomber why he killed the passengers. Although he cannot answer with
"in order to get the insurance money," he might respond by saying "Well, I wanted
the insurance money, and to get it I had to blow up the plane and kill the
passengers." Compare this Why? question with a question about something else
the insurance bomber might have done, namely run the insurance company out of
business by creating such a large claim. Assuming he was unaware that
21 Id.
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destroying the cargo would have this effect, the question why he ran the insurance
company out of business would truly be "refused application." Unlike his answer
to the question why he killed the passengers, the insurance bomber might answer
this question with an expression of surprise-"Did I do that?". This gives us a
basis for thinking that the Wy? question test differentiates foreseen from
unforeseen effects of an agent's action.
Recall, however, that a standard philosopher of action, like Hornsby or
Davidson, thinks it unnecessary to distinguish foreseen from unforeseen effects in
action-theoretic terms. Indeed, they might argue that if we are searching for an
action-theoretic concept to which we can tie responsibility, we should look to the
category of everything an agent does. Davidson suggests as much when he says
that "[e]vent causality can spread responsibility for an action to the consequences
of the action .... So instead of seeking to ground responsibility in the narrow
class of things done for a reason, we might look to the wider category, namely the
class of all things agents do. On this suggestion, then, the realm of responsible
agency would extend past the realm of culpable (or praiseworthy) agency.
The difficulty with this suggestion is that while we previously could not
account for responsibility judgments because the class to which they attached was
too narrow, we now cannot account for them because the class to which they
would attach is too broad, namely the class of all things agents do. Human beings
are not responsible for everything of which they are agents in Davidson's sense.
We want to be able to say the insurance bomber is responsible for killing the
passengers, but not for running the insurance company out of business. But
attaching responsibility to causal contribution would not allow us to distinguish the
two.
Responsibility seems to occupy a middle category between things agents do
for the sake of an end and all things they do. To provide a foundation for
judgments of responsibility, we need some way of identifying this middle category
in action-theoretic terms. The solution that rejects Thesis (2) in favor of a broader
account of acting for a reason achieves this. The second solution we considered,
that which rejects Thesis (1), may seem to identify the relevant middle category as
well, since it retains the connection between responsibility and what an agent does
intentionally. But it is ultimately unhelpful, insofar as it leaves the notion of the
intentional itself unaccounted for. It thus fails to supply the internalist foundation
we earlier claimed was desirable.
A thoroughly internalist account, by contrast, must explain intentional action
in terms of a broad notion of acting for a reason. The category of things for which
an agent is responsible is then the category of things done for reasons. In this Part
I shall explore the idea that the notion of choice might ground an internalist
account of the relation between the ends an agent sets for himself and the foreseen
effects of his pursuit of those ends. Because foreseen side effects are themselves
chosen, an account based on choice will allow us to distinguish killing the
22 Donald Davidson, Agency, in ESSAYS ON ACTIONS AND EVENTS 43, 49 (1980).
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passengers from running the insurance company out of business in the way we
have thought desirable. This would allow us to distinguish internal,
intentionalistic explanation from external, non-agentive explanation without
limiting this distinction to that between things an agent does for the sake of an end,
on the one hand, and everything else he does, on the other.
This solution involves two separate claims:
Thesis (4): If someone 9-s pursuant to a choice to p, he (p-sfor a reason.
Thesis (5): If someone foresees that in w-ing he will 9, then in y-ing he
chooses to (p.
If Theses (4) and (5) are true, an agent does for a reason anything that he
does, foreseeing he will do it. Since the insurance bomber foresaw the passengers'
deaths, he killed the passengers for a reason, namely that he wanted the insurance
money on the cargo. And if an agent does for a reason anything he foresees he
will do in the course of acting, then he does all such things intentionally. If Thesis
(3) is correct, then he is responsible for anything he foresees he will do, and he is
not responsible for anything unforeseen in the course of acting. Thus, unlike
Bratman, who would exclude a number of foreseen side effects from the ambit of
what is done intentionally, I would include all fully foreseen effects. (We will
discuss the question of partially foreseen effects in the next Part.) And I would
exclude all unforeseen effects from the scope of responsible agency. What,
however, is the argument for Theses (4) and (5)?
First consider Thesis (4). Thesis (4) asserts not merely that if an agent
chooses to 9p, and then p-s, there is some description of his action under which he
(p-s for a reason. This is true, but unhelpful in expanding the concept of acting for
a reason. It also asserts that a person who chooses to (p, and actually (p-s, acts for a
reason under the description of his action which is his (-ing. Thus, the thesis
asserts that if the insurance bomber chooses to kill the passengers, he kills them for
a reason, even though he did not particularly desire their deaths. What could make
this true?
When an agent chooses to accept a certain consequence of an action he
performs, he is in some way endorsing that consequence, at least in relation to his
chosen end. That is, the agent could decide to abandon his end when he sees that
certain consequences will follow from the means he must adopt to accomplish it.
The fact that he continues to pursue the end, given the consequences of doing so,
suggests an important connection between the consequences an agent considers in
selecting that end and the end itself. The consequences of the agent's action (both
side effects and intended effects) thus stand in a certain relation of value to one
another in the agent's deliberations, by which I mean that there is a value, or set of
values, that explains the agent's willingness to do this-for-the-sake-of-that, a
background system that relates the thing done as means to the thing aimed at as
end.
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Only given this background normative system can citing the agent's end
explain the thing done: The rational explanatory force of the agent's end stems
from the fact that its relation to the thing done reflects some antecedent value the
agent holds. From this it follows that an agent must have actually deliberated upon
a consequence of an action in order for us to explain what he did as a product of his
reason. It is explanation in light of an agent's reasons that allows us to see the
agent as acting for a reason, and hence as acting intentionally. In the absence of
this reflection, the thing the agent does is accidental from the standpoint of value-
the agent cannot himself have endorsed it. Deliberation puts the stamp of rational
agency on what an agent does.
What, now, about Thesis (5)? This thesis seems to require little argument.
The suggestion is simply that an agent exercises choice over the effects of his
actions he foresees. An agent need not choose something for its own sake in order
to have chosen it. This way of thinking about choice seems to square with our
ordinary use of the term. Imagine once again our outrage at the insurance bomber
if he insisted that he had "no choice" but to kill the passengers, given that he had
the end of destroying the plane. The fact that he could have avoided killing them
by abandoning his plan, but chose to continue anyway, seems an adequate basis for
saying he chose to kill the passengers. Choice, unlike intention, is non-teleological.
Together, Theses (4) and (5) suggest that an agent can be thought of as
performing an action for a reason under any description under which it was
foreseen by him. An action is intentional under any description under which it is
foreseen, and hence it becomes plausible for us to say that an agent is responsible
for his action under any description under which it was done intentionally. We can
thus retain Theses (1) and (3) and reject Thesis (2). In this way, our account is
fully internalist about responsibility.
VI.
What conclusions can we draw for criminal liability from the foregoing
account of responsibility? A defendant who performs a prohibited act or brings
about a prohibited result knowingly does so for a reason, and hence he does so
intentionally. He is thus responsible for it in the descriptive sense we identified in
Part II, and can be morally and legally evaluated for his behavior. By contrast, a
defendant who is wholly unaware of the prohibited act does not do the prohibited
thing for any reason. He is therefore not responsible for the prohibited act or
consequence, and cannot be blamed for having done so. It would follow that there
should be no criminal liability for negligent violations of a criminal norm.
Now even if one accepts the account I have offered, matters may not be this
straightforward. For we have yet to consider cases in between the above two
extremes, where the defendant is aware he is running a risk of violating a criminal
prohibition. If the risk eventuates, does the defendant engage in the prohibited
conduct or bring about the prohibited result for a reason? He certainly runs the
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relevant risk for a reason, since he knowingly does that. But this does not by itself
tell us whether he brings the prohibited conduct or result about for a reason, in
virtue of having foreseen that he might bring it about. The account I have offered
suggests that he does in cases in which the likelihoods are sufficiently high of his
bringing it about, and otherwise not. If he thinks his act is highly likely to result in
the death of another, for example, there is little difference between his
responsibility in that case and the cases we have been considering in which he is
certain to bring about death. At the other extreme, however, if the defendant is
aware of a risk that a certain result will occur, but that risk is so minimal as to be
almost non-existent, he approaches the agent who did not foresee the risk and is
better thought of as not bringing about that result intentionally. He is probably not
responsible for it in that case.
To be sure, there will be gray-area cases in the middle. Does a defendant who
runs a fifty percent risk of killing someone kill that person intentionally? And if so,
what about a slightly smaller or slightly greater risk? The uncertain response of the
present account to such cases does not seem to count against it, given that such
cases are unsettled both in morality and in law. The important point is that the
cases in which we are inclined to treat the agent as responsible for the consequence
will be ones in which we are also inclined to think he acted intentionally, whereas
the ones in which we judge him not responsible are cases in which we think of his
conduct as unintentional.
Notice that this approach to agents who knowingly engage in risky behavior
comports with the criminal law's standard definition of recklessness. The Model
Penal Code (MPC) defines recklessness as when a person "consciously disregards
a substantial and unjustifiable risk" that the prohibited result will occur. 23 By
requiring that the risk the defendant perceived be "substantial," the MPC exempts
the defendant who brings about a highly unlikely harm from the ambit of
recklessness. 24 The MPC does not indicate what level of likelihood is sufficient to
count as "substantial;" a lacuna the Commentaries to the Code specifically endorse
by saying that the matter is properly left to the jury's discretion.2 5  But if
"substantial" is a descriptive, rather than a normative concept, then the MPC's
notion of recklessness roughly covers the same territory as the account of
responsibility defended here.
26
23 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(c) (1962).
24 Such a defendant would not even be "negligent" under the MPC's definition (§ 2.02(d)),
since even the risk involved with negligence must be "substantial." The difference between
recklessness and negligence is of course that the risk need not be perceived where the latter is
concerned.
25 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. at 237 (1985).
26 Peter Arenella has recently argued to me that the MPC's understanding of "substantial" is in
fact normative rather than descriptive. And if this is correct, then recklessness as defined under the
MPC would not be suited to a descriptive conception of responsibility.
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An interesting question arises in the case in which the defendant is aware of
running a risk, but in which he underestimates the magnitude of the risk. The MPC
does not indicate whether the substantiality of the risk should be included within
the agent's conscious disregard: Should the defendant be considered reckless as
long as he was aware of running a risk, and the risk was substantial and
unjustifiable, even if his perception of the risk was that it was not substantial? The
better account, and one supported by the approach proposed here as well, is that the
agent who consciously disregards a substantial risk is responsible for the
consequence that eventuates from that risk only if he was aware not only of the
risk's existence, but also of its substantiality. The defendant who believes a risk to
be considerably smaller than it in fact is, such that he would not be responsible if
the risks were as he supposed, would not be responsible for the consequence if it
eventuates from the risk. But the reverse is not true. A defendant who thought a
risk substantial when it was not would not be responsible for the eventuation of the
risk, despite the fact that he believed he was acting in the face of a high likelihood
of bringing about the very harm that did occur.
27
It is worth noting an aspect of the MPC's approach to recklessness with which
we might disagree. The MPC builds "justifiability" into the very definition of
recklessness. The purpose of this provision is clear: the surgeon who performs a
highly risky operation is not reckless, since he runs the risk of bringing about the
patient's death justifiably. I believe this is a mistake. It conflicts with the idea of a
non-moralized conception of responsibility, according to which responsibility is
only the precondition for praising or blaming an agent for something he did.
Saying he is not reckless is tantamount to saying he is not responsible for killing
the patient. But that seems wrong. The surgeon who performs a highly risky
operation is fully responsible for the death of his patient, if such results. But he is
not to blame for having killed him, since he has a justification for having done so,
namely that the patient stood to benefit from the operation, and consented to its
occurrence on that basis. The MPC approach to recklessness builds the
justificatory condition into the definition of the mental state, thus confounding
prima facie conditions of responsibility with ultimate conditions, in just the way we
saw with Hart's account above.
Accounting for responsibility in terms of foresight of harm, as Turner
originally proposed, thus gives us a plausible approach to responsibility, an
approach that easily generalizes to responsibility judgments in the criminal arena.
It also makes sense of several important aspects of existing criminal law doctrine.
In particular, it suggests that criminal negligence should be a much disfavored form
of liability. It would place criminal negligence in a class of rather marginal
27 Such cases are unlikely to arise in practice, particularly as there is a tendency to exaggerate
the ex ante risks of an unlikely event occurring once it actually does occur. But if the defendant could
convincingly show that the risk of which he was aware was in fact minute, he should be treated like
the person who commits an attempt: he is only liable for any crime that attaches to believing he is
behaving badly. He was not in fact behaving badly.
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doctrines of responsibility, such as complicit and vicarious liability, doctrines for
which we have no justification other than their overall utility. But if, as I suggested
at the outset, criminal responsibility is simply another form of responsibility in
ordinary morality, consequentialist arguments for its imposition should provide
inadequate justification.
VII.
I shall conclude by considering two important objections to the account I have
traced. The first objection is that the descriptive account of responsibility must
presuppose some account of causation, since an agent must cause the conduct or
result he foresees in order to be responsible for it. But it is commonly thought that
the commonsense notion of cause already has the notion of responsibility built into
it, and thus the former cannot be used to elucidate the latter. As William Dray has
pointed out, if two historians were to debate "whether it was Hitler's invasion of
Poland or Chamberlain's pledge to defend it which caused the outbreak of the
Second World War," they must be discussing who was at fault for the outbreak of
the war.28 Or consider two cars that collide at an intersection, where one driver had
a stop sign and the other a clear right of way. Our judgment that the driver who
failed to stop at the sign caused the accident would surely reflect a judgment that
the accident was that driver's fault for failing to stop. Otherwise we might as well
say the accident was caused by the non-faulty driver's failing to drive just a little bit
faster or a little bit slower. Cases such as these have led some authors to conclude
that the notion of causation must be preceded by a moral theory, and that we cannot
identify anything as the cause of anything else non-normatively.29
If the above claims about causation were correct, the account I have offered
would be problematic. For if the notion of cause is parasitic on that of fault, then
"being the cause of' cannot be an ingredient in a purely descriptive account of
responsibility. Instead, responsibility must be imputed, since the causal relations
on which it depends would themselves be imputed. If this is correct, there is no
reason to resist responsibility in the absence of foresight of consequences. For we
would have no reason not to "impute" responsibility to agents whose conduct falls
below a certain normative standard. The appropriateness of such imputations
would be a matter of the purposes we had in making them, as Hart early on
suggested. And given that even an agent's unintentional behavior can be
influenced or deterred with threat of sanction, punishment for unintentional
30
conduct might suit our purposes.
28 WILLIAM H. DRAY, LAWS AND EXPLANATION IN HISTORY 100 (1957).
29 Arthur Ripstein, Equality, Luck and Responsibility, 23 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3 (1994).
30 Indeed, it might turn out to be the case that imputing responsibility in the absence of
causation suited our purposes. On this view, there would be no reason to resist such imputations
either.
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But one should not infer from the indeterminate nature of causation in some
cases that causation is indeterminate everywhere. In particular, the central cases of
responsibility we might consider display no causal indeterminacy. If I kill you by
shooting you, no one would seriously deny that the shooting was the cause of your
death, despite the fact that, like the discussion of Dray's historians, there are other
causal factors required for my shooting to cause your death. As Joel Feinberg
writes, "[e]xplanatory citations single out abnormal interferences with the normal
course of events or hitherto unknown missing links in a person's understanding.
They are designed simply to remove puzzlement by citing the causal factor that can
shed the most light.",31 That we are not presupposing a judgment of culpability
when we identify one causal factor as the cause is moreover evident from the fact
that we can identify causal factors where human agents are not involved: the cause
of that tree's falling over can be identified in terms of the "abnormal interference"
of high winds.
32
There are, however, two sorts of cases in which the normative account of
causation seems particularly difficult to avoid. The first is one in which several
causal factors vie for position as overall cause of an event, and there is no clear
irregularity that suggests itself as cause. But such cases need not stand as a
challenge to the descriptive account of responsibility. For on a descriptive account,
it is acceptable to conclude that more than one agent is "responsible" for an
occurrence, since this does not entail that more than one agent is to blame. Thus,
Chamberlain might be "responsible" for the outbreak of war, along with Hitler,
since actions of both contributed causally to that outcome, but one need not
therefore conclude that both agents are to blame. If the supposed causal
indeterminacy rests on the existence of multiple causal factors, it need not threaten
our ability to offer a descriptive account of responsibility, since that account
requires only the existence of a causal factor, not necessarily a unique causal
relationship.
In this sense, judgments of responsibility are different from judgments of
culpability. If we are asking who was to blame for a certain occurrence, we are
normally asking for a unique identification, or at any rate, if more than one person
was to blame, each must independently satisfy the moral criteria for
blameworthiness. But where non-normative responsibility is concerned, it is not
3 1 Feinberg calls this "the lantern criterion" for causation. Joel Feinberg, Sua Culpa, in DOING
AND DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 204 (1970).
32 Feinberg's proposal is subject to the objection that there are many instances in which we
can inquire into the causes of ordinary events. Thus, we can ask what causes the tides, or the earth to
turn, or the sky to appear red at sunset, even though these are the most ordinary of events. But we
might distinguish here between events generally and particular events. Feinberg's suggestion seems
correct as applied to the latter. Thus, we cannot easily ask what made the sky appear red at the end of
the day today, unless it was unusually red, i.e., displayed an irregularity. The question otherwise can
only be a request for an explanation of sunsets generally, and it is here that Feinberg's suggestion
seems less helpful.
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objectionable to ascribe partial responsibility to each causal factor, tailoring
responsibility to degree of causal contribution. This common-sense approach to
causation is only possible once responsibility is uncoupled from blame.
The second sort of case in which the normative approach may seem inevitable
is one in which there is a clear irregularity to use as a basis for choosing among
causal factors, but in which the irregularity can only be identified normatively. It is
this way with omissions, as in the case of the driver who failed to stop at the stop
sign. While these cases seem more challenging for the descriptive approach to
responsibility, the following answer suggests itself. One need not infer from the
fact that the irregularity is normatively identified that the causal relation is itself a
normative one. That is, the law establishes a duty to stop at stop signs, in light of
which other drivers come to have both a (normative) right to rely on the observance
of this duty and a (descriptive) expectation that drivers will stop at stop signs.
Where a driver fails to stop at a stop sign, the expected regularity is not present,
and the breach of regularity can be identified as the cause of the resulting accident.
That we can identify the driver who fails to stop at the sign as the cause of the
accident without relying on a judgment of fault can be seen by considering the
justified omission, namely the man who is driving his wife in labor to the hospital.
We can still identify the failure to stop at the stop sign as the cause of the accident,
even though the defendant has a justification for failing to stop and hence is not at
fault. And this shows that the notion of cause can provide an independent element
in a conception of responsibility, even where omissions are concerned.
A second objection to the account I have offered concerns my assumption that
criminal responsibility mirrors our responsibility practices in ordinary morality.
Given that individuals are sometimes held criminally liable for harm they did not
foresee, and even sometimes for harm they did not cause, why do I think that
criminal responsibility mirrors moral responsibility? Corporate responsibility and
vicarious liability might further support one's suspicion that the criminal law is just
a series of conventions, united under a single institution. The institution of
criminal justice presumably is meant to satisfy some set of social purposes, just as
the various institutions of tort law serve distinct social goals. On this view, the
only constraint on forms of responsibility-ascription should be the contribution they
make to the relevant institution's goals.
While the foregoing would constitute a perfectly coherent view of the criminal
law, I do not believe it is our view. It is true that there are isolated instances in
which criminal responsibility is merely "imputed" without regard for the underlying
"facts" about responsible agency, but most rules of criminal liability nevertheless
track our moral practices quite closely. At the very least, the core prohibitory
norms of the special part, those based on common law crimes, are rules of moral
disapprobation. And while there are many more recent regulatory offenses that
cannot be readily intuited from our moral practices in the way that the common law
crimes can, most of these are reasonable extensions of common law crimes. Those
that are not might be questioned.
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To be sure, we could conceive the criminal law along different, more
utilitarian lines. We could regard criminal law exclusively as an instrument for
social control, and treat the rules of criminal liability as a list of prices meant to
discourage inefficient behavior. But, as many theorists have noted, the institution
would probably lose its effectiveness in this form. 33 The criminal law's connection
with morality is a crucial part of its ability to deter and to contribute to the teaching
of moral standards. There is thus a consequentialist argument for designing rules
of criminal conduct that mirror the practices of responsibility we follow in our
moral lives, that is, a consequentialist reason for maintaining an institution that
incorporates norms of responsibility and blame.
33 Paul Robinson & John Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 453 (1997).
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